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SUMMARY
This report reviews the application of applied fracture mechanics in the design,
analysis, andqualification of aircraft structural systems. Recentservice experiences
are cited.
Current trends in high-strength materials application are reviewed with particu-
lar emphasis on the manner in which fracture toughness and structural efficiency may
affect the material selection process.
General fracture control procedures are reviewed in depth with specific refer-
ence to the impact of inspectability, structural arrangement, and material on proposed
analysis requirements for safe crack growth. The relative impact on allowable design
stress is indicated by example.
Design criteria, material, and analysis requirements for implementation of frac-
ture control procedures are reviewed together with limitations in current available data
techniques. A summary of items which require further study and attention is
presented.
"Fracture Mechanics has, in fact, been a boon to the metal producing industry; it
has made the finite crack in a structure reputable and even fashionable." (Quoted from
A. M. Freudenthal, Miami Beach, Florida, December 1969.)
INTRODUCTION
Primary aircraft structural components generally contain flaws or defects of
variable shape, orientation, and criticality which are either inherent in the basic mate-
rial or are introduced during the fabrication or assembly processes.
From an industry survey (ref. 1) it was concluded that the majority of cracks
found in aircraft structures were initiated from tool marks, manufacturing defects, and
the like. When not detected, these flaws experience the combined driving forces of
environment and service loading and may grow to serious proportions resulting in
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reduction of service life or complete loss of the aircraft. The final fracture process is
most often sudden,unexpected,and almost totally devoidof gross plastic deformation or
yielding. While this "brittlelike" behavior is most spectacular in the so-called high-
strength alloys, it is seento occur to somedegree in most of the commonlyused air-
craft structural materials.
Recent casesof catastrophic failure in primary structure of first-line aircraft
have emphasizedthe needfor a "fresh" new look at the structural integrity process cur-
rently usedto designand qualify structural systems. Under such an improved process,
fracture control would insure the reduction in the probability of catastrophic failure due
to the presenceof undetectedflaws andcracks. This assurancecanbest be achievedby
the intelligent material selection basedon fracture as well as commonstrength con-
siderations andby assumingthe existence of flaws in "new" structures andaccounting
for their probable growth during service.
Linear elastic fracture mechanicsanalysis andtesting techniqueshave reached
the state of developmentwhere they may beused with a moderate level of confidenceto
assessthe degreeof flaw criticality, to predict the extent of subcritical flaw growth
prior to fracture, and to determine the resultant failure modes(ref. 2). Muchof the
basic groundworkfor the current application of linear elastic fracture mechanicsto
"real" structures canbeattributed to the investigation associatedwith fracture control
of metallic pressure vessels for spaceapplications (refs. 3 and4). While attempts to
translate this technologyto aircraft usagehavebeenmoderately successful, limitations
must be recognizedwhich are dueto the complexspectrum of loads, temperatures, and
chemically aggressive agentsthat comprise the aircraft environment.
Fail-safe procedures in aircraft haveresulted from civil requirements and from
independentregulation within the particular airframe company. Theseefforts havebeen
beneficial onmanyAir Force aircraft.
Application of fracture mechanicswithin the Air Force has beenalmost exclusively
"after the fact" to determine remaining safe life with cracks, residual strength, and safe
inspection intervals for older systems in which flaws have developedand progressed to
near-critical dimensions. Someexamplesof service application in which the Air Force
Flight Dynamics Laboratory (AFFDL) actively participated are summarized in table I
(see refs. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10). In practically all cases, however, attempts to formulate
reliable solutions were hamperedby the lack of anadequatematerial-environmental data
base and deficiencies in analysis techniques,particularly those techniqueswhich must
accountfor load interaction and environmental effects. Onepurposeof this paper is to
review thoseareas of application where deficiencies in the technologyexist andto offer
suggestionsfor alleviating these deficiencies.
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Under the F-111 RecoveryProgram (ref. 9), basic fracture mechanicsdata are cur-
rently beingamassedfor D6ac steel by the contractor and several laboratories. (See
refs. 8, 11, and 12.)
Specific criteria, guidelines, or requirements for considering fracture mechanics
principles in the design andprocurement cycle for Air Force aircraft havenot existed
in the past. Only recently have requirements beenlevied for new systems. It is too
early to assess their impact. In the proposed revisions to the Air Force Airplane
Structural Integrity Program (ASIP)which is given in reference 13, damagetolerance
considerations are outlined. Thesechangesare currently being reviewed prior to being
formally incorporated.
There exists a natural unwillingness amongstmany to accept the "preexistent flaw"
conceptin aircraft designbecauseof the weight penalties normally associatedwith
damage-resistant structures. There are thosewho cite system performance degrada-
tion andthe time and cost of implementing fracture requirements as deterrents. The
imposition of arbitrary fracture requirements shouldbedonecautiously under current
state-of-the-art limitations in analysis methodsand testing techniquesare resolved and
material-environmental behavior is better understood.
In this paper, recent structural material utilization casesare summarized to indi-
cate thoseproblems associatedwith the use of high-strength material. General fracture
control procedures are reviewed with specific reference to the impact of safe crack
growth and remaining strength requirements on system design. Examplesare cited,
including recent laboratory efforts in the analysis of crack growth under variable-
amplitude spectrum loading. Limitations in basic design criteria, material data_and
analysis are reviewed.
SYMBOLS
a crack size, length or depth, inches
acr critical crack size, inches
av proof-test crack size, inches
_a change in crack size, inches
B,t thickness, inches
one-half surface crack length, inches
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EK
Kc
KIc
KISCC
Kmax
Kmin
modulus of elasticity, ksi
frequency of test load application, cycle/minute
stress intensity factor, ksi-
critical stress intensity factor, ksi-
plane strain fracture toughness, ksi- i_.
critical stress intensity factor for stress corrosion cracking, ksi-
maximum stress intensity factor, ksi-
minimum stress intensity factor, ksi-
AK = Kmax - Kmin, ksi-
M,N
P
R Kmin
Kmax
ry,Ry
A(_
_L
da/dN
da/dt
number of load cycles
material density, Ib/in3
radius of crack tip yield zone, inches
stress, ksi
change in stress, ksi
limit stress, ksi
yield strength, ksi
fatigue crack growth
environmental crack growth
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Subscripts"
0,1,2,3,... reference values
A,B,C,D,E,F,G requirements
c critical
i initial
f final
max maximum
min minimum
MATERIALS UTILIZATION IN STRUCTURAL DESIGN -
RESISTANCE TO FRACTURE
With the advent of higher performance air vehicles, weight minimization has neces-
sitated optimum design and construction techniques and greater utilization of the high-
strength, high-efficiency, and limited-ductility materials. The process also has evolved
increased operating stresses and, thus, lower tolerance to flaws and cracks.
These applications have resulted in critical flaw dimensions of the order of the
material thickness which make positive detection by current nondestructive inspection
(NDI) practice questionable. Current trends in the structural design utilization of high-
strength alloys for resistance to catastrophic fracture can be evaluated by examining
trends in two basic material parameters, the plane strain fracture toughness index Kic
and the conventional yield strength _ys"
For a specific application, the designer must select a material of reasonably high
strength in order to meet static strength requirements and still achieve minimum weight.
A parameter for evaluating structural efficiency (Crys/P) is mentioned later. In the
selection process, however, fracture toughness must be a consideration. The achieve-
ment of maximum yield strength and maximum fracture toughness is often difficult as is
illustrated in figure 1. It is generally recognized that within certain material groups,
toughness decreases with increasing yield strength. This trend is illustrated in figure 1
for aluminum, titanium, and several selected steels where material data from table II
have been plotted. Variations in KIc can be expected for any given alloy and strength
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level, andthese variations are generally dueto metallurgical aspects, impurities, or
manufacturing processing. This variability makes the selection of a "design allowable"
extremely difficult.
In specifying a particular material andstrength level (minimum acceptable ays),
the designer usually wouldnot be concernedaboutthosequantities of material which
possessedstrength levels on the upper endof the normal range. However, becauseof
the dramatic decrease in Kic , hemust in many cases limit the upper boundof acceptable
range of yield strength. This is current practice in specifying titanium alloys. In fig-
ure 1, Kic ranges for two commontitanium alloys are noted. Thesedata are shownat
oneyield strength value to illustrate the fallacy in specifying only ays minimum.
Recent F-111 experiencewith D6ac steel has indicated a similar phenomenon;however,
the variation of Kic is dependentuponthe heat treatment procedure (ref. 9). In this
case, two specimensof material from different lots might possessthe same measured
ay s and yet have a two-to-one range in Kic.
The material selection process is therefore a trade-off procedure wherein many
concurrent requirements must be satisfied. For the case in point, the designer must
establish criteria for accepting either a reduced toughness or a reduced strength level.
The choice might be dictated by overall flaw tolerance. This is illustrated in figure 2
(Kic/_ys) 2, a parameter indicative of crack size, is used. Sincewhere the ordinate
structures are designed to withstand (statically) a percentage of the yield strength, this
parameter may be conveniently used to illustrate flaw tolerance sensitivity. Examination
of figure 2 indicates a more dramatic reduction in the crack length parameter with
increased yield strength.
The same trend is repeated in figure 3; however, the yield strength has been nor-
malized with respect to the material density p. The parameter _ys/P is one form of
structural efficiency used to select materials. Note that material ranking has changed,
with titanium being superior to steel. One exception illustrated is that 18Ni-Co-Mo
maraging steel and 9Ni-4Co-2C fall beyond the bounds illustrated. There are recogniz-
able limits on the values of both (Kic/ays) 2 and ays/p for materials in use today.
The bounds are illustrated in figure 3.
The data presented in figure 3 clearly illustrate the relationship of nondestructive
inspection (NDI) capability and material selection to resist brittle fracture. For
example, a through-the-thickness crack will experience plane strain fracture when
K = Kic = a _a_-_cr. If fracture is assumed to occur at the design limit stress, the value
of critical crack length acr can be computed. For many aircraft structures, design
limit stress is of the order of aL = 0.6(_y s and a [ KIc \2 1 /KIc_ 2 m. ,cr =" -- • - ='_' • lnuseacn\0.6vs/ \vs/
point in figure 3 might be considered the critical characteristic flaw dimension for plane
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strain fracture andthus would describe the sensitivity level required for fleet inspection.
For this type of selection criterion, manymaterials may beprohibited becauseof the
extremely small flaws which must bedetected. Limits of NDI practice are not well
defined.
With the technological trend in material utilization growing toward greater strength-
density ratios, it seems logical also to define more realistic limits on the material selec-
tion basedon uncontrollable "human element" defects. Thus, the crack size definition of
figure 3 might indicate limits producedby normal tool marks, scratches, or gougespro-
ducedduring manufacture or maintenance. If these limits are recognizedas sound,then
more effective meansof inspection may be required, suchas proof testing, if use is to be
madeof thesealloys (fig. 4).
All the data from table II has beenplotted in figure 5with both Kic and _ys
normalized with respect to density p. This plot indicates an apparent technological
limit which material producers might find difficult to exceed (ref. 2).
In the previous discussion it was assumed that plane strain fracture is dominant.
Fortunately, this is not always the case because of the effect of thickness, plasticity, and
geometry (figs. 6 and 7). The question does remain, however, as to what role Kic has
in the material selection and analysis process.
It is perhaps safe to conclude that the selection of candidate materials for fracture
considerations can be made on the basis of superior Kic , as long as the materials are
similar. The decision, however, rests upon the thickness required to fulfill the task. In
figure 7, the variation of critical stress intensity factor with thickness is illustrated for
several alloys (ref. 2).
MATERIAL SELECTION - RESISTANCE TO FLAW GROWTH
UNDER REPEATED LOADS
In the preceding discussion, Kic and ays were shown to be effective parameters
in selecting a material class and alloy to resist brittle fracture under plane strain condi-
tions. Wide variations in strength and toughness were indicated within a given material.
Toughness was also seen to vary within a given alloy group.
Material selection based on cyclic growth considerations is not as clearly defined,
since observed trends in rate data for a nonaggressive environment indicate that mate-
rials within a group or class generally fall within a narrow scatterband, with little, if any,
dependence on toughness. Average growth-rate curves have been included in figure 8 to
illustrate the relative relationship between materials. Hahn (ref. 6) has observed that the
rate da/dN can be approximated for many materials as
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in the central or log linear portion of the growth-rate curve. Several points are shown
in figure 8 which were obtainedby using the Hahnexpression. Becauseof the relation-
ship of growth rate to modulus E, the datacanbe normalized with respect to the mate-
rial density p as indicated in figure 9 where rate curves are seen to converge. It is
apparent, then, that a material's advantage can only be assessed on an individual applica-
tion basis. Growth under variable-amplitude spectrum loading, for example, may produce
different trends in growth retardation due to the interaction of loads. Generally speaking,
however, the time to failure from an initial flaw is dependent primarily upon the toughness
Kic. This is illustrated in figure 10, with cutoffs for several levels of toughness. The
relative effect, however, may be dependent upon the shape and severity of the spectrum.
While the preceding discussion has been concerned with the cyclic flaw growth
behavior, the selection of materials for repeated load application in the presence of flaws
may be seriously influenced by the chemical and thermal environments in which the struc-
ture must operate. No attempt is made in this paper to cover these trends. The reader
is referred to several excellent publications (refs. 6, 11, 14, and 15).
FRACTURE CONTROL - BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
The traditional Air Force approach to structural integrity (ref. 13) requires that
"safe life" be evaluated through the cyclic test program. The success of this approach
in determining the overall fatigue resistance of full-scale structures has been well
documented (refs. 6 and 16). The achievement of "fatigue quality" through careful work-
manship, surface finishes, and detailed design (local stress levels) and the demonstration
of resistance to crack initiation are basic and reasonable goals. Therefore, before pre-
senting suggested procedures for fracture control, it is important that two basic tenets
be stated:
(1) Damage tolerant design and fracture control philosophy should not be considered
as substitutes for adequate fatigue considerations.
(2) Consideration must be given to the probable existence of flaws within all basic
primary structures.
Crack initiation resistance and fracture resistance should be considered as complementary
objectives.
By virtue of its complex nature and varied operational regimes, an airframe
encounters a wide variety of natural and induced environments. While this makes the
application of fracture theory a rather difficult task, the general overall goals which must
be achieved are rather simply stated, as follows:
444
(1) Encouragethe intelligent selection of fracture-resistant materials, manufac-
turing processes, and so forth
(2) Provide an incentive to design for inspectability with damage-resistant
structural configurations (i.e., multiple loadpaths)
(3) Aid in establishing effective and realistic inspection procedures
(4) Assist in selecting and controlling safe operating stresses
In the Materials Utilization section, materials datawere presented to illustrate how
strength-density ratio (efficiency) could result in the selection of material with an unde-
sirable level of toughness. Likewise, the choice basedon fatigue alonemight lead to
serious difficulty since manyhigh-strength materials (steels, for example)may have
acceptablefatigue resistance but possesslow resistance to brittle fracture and subcritical
flaw growth (stress corrosion cracking, for example).
Structural configurations which possess multiple load paths, crack stoppers, and so
forth, are necessaryand desirable; however, their ability to function andmeet specific
preassignedgoals must be demonstratedearly in design.
Controlling designstress levels for commonstructural materials canhave untold
benefits from both the strength and fatigue points of view andcanprevent costly field
maintenanceproblems. For example,multiple load path, redundant,andfail-safe
arrangements may effectively prevent the loss of aircraft, so long as adequateandfre-
quent inspections are planned. The sole dependenceon the fail-safe approachto achiev-
ing fracture control without regard to limiting designstresses may result in frequent
member failures, costly unscheduledmaintenance,andaircraft downtime. This situation
canbe alleviated by requiring each member in the multiple or redundantset to be inher-
ently resistant to flaw growth within prescribed bounds(i.e., it must havea safe life with
cracks).
The ability to detect andquantify flaws and cracks, both in the raw product form
and the final assembledstructural article, remains as the most significant measure in
deterring catastrophic fracture. Instituting fracture control procedures is, in fact, a
frank admittancethat serious flaws canandoften do goundetected. This fact was
dramatically pointedout by Packman,Pearson, Owens,andYoung(ref. 17) in a study for
the Air Force Materials Laboratory. The data in figure 11have beenobtainedfrom that
report and depict the sensitivity and reliability of commonNDI methodsin controlled
laboratory experiments. The results are quite surprising becauserelatively large flaws
were not detected. This does not meanthat all hopeis lost of improving present methods
andprocedures. On the contrary, continueddevelopmentof improved NDI techniques is
mandatory.
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Fracture control procedures are most beneficial if effectively implemented and
managed. Implementation consists of satisfying specific requirements for analysis and
test basedon established ground rules anddefinitions of required strength, assumed
damage,service life, and inspection intervals. A balanceddesignwithin the goals of
damagetolerance is thus insured. It is important that the basic definitions, goals, and
fracture requirements be e_tablishedearly in the designphasein order to impact trade
studies. Implementation requires a firm material database, knowledgeof operational
environments, designcriteria, andan analytical capacity to perform complexflaw-growth
and strength analyses.
If fracture control procedures are instituted early, they form a portion of the basic
designcriteria andno weight penalties can thenbe attributed to their existence. Weight
penalties are only recognizedif the requirements are levied after the design is frozen.
FRACTURECONTROL- REQUIREMENTS
It shouldbeacknowledgedthat the preparation of detailed step-by-step require-
ments for fracture control is a difficult task becauseof the numerous classes of aircraft
(i.e., fighter bombers, trainers, etc.) in use todayby the Air Force andbecauseof the
various types of structural arrangements which comprise these airframes. With regard
to the structural aspects, the term "DamageTolerant" is perhapsmost commonandis
used within the Air Force (ref. 13)to describe those configurations "which will minimize
the loss of aircraft dueto the propagationof undetectedflaws, cracks, or other damage."
Supplementalrequirements for the ASIP (ref. 13)andvarious military specifica-
tions (ref. 18)are currently being formulated to insure the achievementof damage-
tolerant design. Suchrequirements will be applicable to all primary structures, the
failure of which would reducethe strength level below specified limits and endangerthe
safe operational flight characteristics of the aircraft.
In general, requirements to insure adequatefracture control take on the form of
specific directives in the areas of (1) design, (2) analysis, and (3) test.
In the following discussion, a representative set of specifications for fracture con-
trol is described to indicate the relative levels of importanceplaced on structural
arrangements, inspections, and so forth.
It is generally recognizedthat there are two major design stepswhich are required
to produce a damage-tolerant structure:
(1) Controlled safe flaw growth (safe life with cracks)
(2) Positive damagecontainment(remaining or residual strength)
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Neither of these shouldbe consideredseparate anddistinct, however, since it is the
judicious combinationof both that is required for effective fracture control.
Since the assumptionis madethat flaws do exist in newstructures andcan go
undetected,full compliancewith this philosophy requires that consideration begiven to
the probability that flaws will exist in any and/or all members, including each element of
a redundantor multiple loadpath group. This is important becauseit is easy to rational-
ize that each member of the multiple set could be flawed. For example, if stress cor-
rosion is responsible for the existence of subsurface cracks in one member, there is no
assurancethat each adjoining member does not contain cracks of a similar character.
The first major requirement for fracture resistance must, therefore, dictate that any
member must have a safe life with assumedcracks present.
For anygiven application, the overriding factors which govern the details and com-
plexity of the fracture requirements anddemonstrations are (fig. 12)
(1) The class or type of structure
(2) The quality of production andassembly NDI
(3) The accessibility of the structure
(4) The assurance that the member will be inspected in service
(5) The probability that a flaw of subcritical size would goundetectedeventhough
periodic inspections are made
Most structural members canbe classified by load path (fig. 13):
(1) Single load path
(2) Single primary load path with auxiliary crack arrest features
(3) Multiple and redundant load path
Class 2 includes such items as pressure cabins and pressure vessels, where rela-
tively large amounts of damage may be contained by providing tear straps, stiffeners,
and the like. While some load shedding does take place, the primary load path is singular.
Detection of damage for such cases is likely, because of fuel or pressure leakage.
Class 3 structures are generally designed so that some percentage of original
strength is retained during and subsequent to the failure of one element (often called fail
safe). Assurance of this capability should be mandatory by analysis and tests. The con-
tainment of damage is often produced by natural barriers such as production splices and
so forth.
Accessibility and inspectability were indicated in the section on Basic Considera-
tions for Fracture Control as major items in fracture control. This point cannot be
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overemphasized. Not only should the structure be inspectable, but assurance must be
given that it will be inspected periodically after assembly. Because of recent experi-
ences with high-strength materials, speculation has arisen whether or not subsurface
cracks of near-critical size can be found in service by use of routine inspection proce-
dures and equipment. A positive criterion such as "leak before break" may have to be
levied in order to assure their detection. Otherwise, an inspectable structure would
have to be classified as noninspectable. (See fig. 14.)
Engineering Criteria - Definitions
Before specific fracture requirements for design, analysis, and test can be levied,
certain aspects of loading and service must be defined for each type of aircraft. In most
cases, these items will be unique for each particular system and will be specified in the
basic design criteria.
Strength limits.- The percentage of unflawed static strength which is to be main-
tained with prescribed amounts of damage must be established. This load is generally
the limit load but may vary with aircraft types.
Dynamic factors.- The effect of dynamic load amplification due to the release of
energy as the damage is introduced must be included.
Inspection intervals.- Inspection intervals shall be consistent with required safe
crack growth intervals and the requirements for residual strength.
Damage limits.- The size of initial flaws which may be expected to slip by inspec-
tion must be established from NDI capability studies. Final damage limits will be based
on fracture and inspection requirements. In addition, the number and locations of mem-
bers which are to be considered failed for residual strength purposes must be identified.
Damage limits should be established for each system based on individual requirements,
materials applications, and so forth.
Design Trade Study Analyses
A primary function of the fracture control requirements during early design stages
is to assist in the selection of damage-resistant materials and structures, with some
incentive offered to those that are easily inspectable and those that include multiple or
redundant load paths. In figure 15, key factors which influence these trade studies are
summarized. Each member is first classified as to structural type, inspectability, and
so forth, and a candidate material is selected. Limits of assumed initial damage size
are assigned together with the engineering criteria for life, strength, and final damage
size. The analysis is then performed by utilizing the appropriate cyclic and sustained
loads and environments. The process is then iterated until a satisfactory combination
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of material and stress level is selected which fulfills the strength and life requirements.
The resultant information is then incorporated with other design considerationsuntil a
satisfactory design is achieved.
Analysis - Detailed Requirements
The analysis consists of determining the growth rates of initial flaws under cyclic
loadingand environment andinsuring that these flaws remain subcritical for the specified
time period. Initial flaw sizes generally reflect the NDI capability but may be influenced
by suchcriteria as proof tests and manufacturingprocesses. The flaws are generally
assumedto be normal to the maximum principal stress field. The character and shape
of the flaws are usually influencedby such aspectsas
(1) Materials and processing
(2) Manufacturing and assembly
(3) Handlingand service conditions
Experience has indicated that the flaw types shownin figure 16are most representative
in aircraft.
In table III, a set of hypothetical analysis requirements have beentabulated for the
three classes of structures, baseduponwhether or not the assemblies will be inspected
in service.1 The information from table III has beentranslated into figures 17, 18,
and 19 for clarity. As is indicated, eachclass is designedfor a safe crack growth period
from an initial flaw. The final fracture dimensions are governedby plane strain fracture
at limit load unless conditions indicate that this modeof fracture is unlikely. Some
motivation to designwith inspectability andwith high-toughnessmaterials (andthus
higher stresses) is offered for (a3 > a5)and (a4 > a5). The final crack dimensions a3
and a4 must truly bedetectablehowever; otherwise, the structure shouldbe reclassi-
fied as noninspectable. It waspreviously stated that subsurfaceflaws most likely should
beput in the noninspectableclass (for service inspections). However, in most cases, it
is possible to achieve through-the-thickness cracks andthus "positive detection" with
proper selection of materials and stresses.
A safe life period of two inspection intervals has beenindicated for the class 1 and
class 3 inspectable cases. This will result in a slight reduction in allowable design
stresses but will offer more chanceto detect the subcritical crack.
For the class 1, single load path, structure the requirement to satisfy a safe life
with cracks is easily acceptedbecauseof the consequenceof losing the member.
1These requirements are presented for purposeof illustration only and donot
represent USAFpolicy.
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However, as previously stated, the preexistent flaw conceptrequires that all members,
including eachmember of a multiple load set, beassumedflawed. It is not sufficient
simply to design the multiple load path structure to a remaining strength criterion with
oneprincipal member failed. This doesnot insure that initial flaws in a member will
not grow to critical size in a relatively short period of time and result in broken mem-
bers and unscheduled,costly maintenance. Therefore, the safe life requirements C and
E as listed in table III and indicated in figure 18 are applicable to every member of the
structure. However, since there should be some incentive to design class 3 structures,
the size of the initial assumed flaws in the class 3 structure is reduced from that in the
class 1 structure for the noninspectable case (a 1 < a2). By doing this, the designer is
admitting that the design is more comfortable and that he is willing to take a larger risk
of operating with cracks.
Supplemental safe life (with cracks) requirements (F and G) for the class 3 struc-
ture are listed in table IH and are applicable to the remaining structure after the one
principal member has failed. In these requirements, the assumption is made that the
element could fail at any time during the life (or inspection period) and go undetected.
The remaining structure (assumed to be flawed) would then be required to carry the maxi.
mum load for the duration of the remaining specified time period. The stresses which
result from requirements F and G most likely will dominate the design. In actual prac-
tice, studies would have to be conducted to determine the most appropriate time to
assume the member failure. In requirement F, the remaining growth period would be
one inspection interval regardless of when the member was assumed to have failed. As
is indicated in figure 19, the total growth in any one member is equal to the amount which
occurs prior to the failure of the principal element plus the amount which occurs subse-
quent to the failure at an increased stress level.
Alternate Scheme to Assess Remaining Life
In the previous section, requirements F and G (table IH) were presented to satisfy
the requirement for some remaining life in the multiple load structure after the failure
of any principal member. An alternate scheme, and one which may be less restrictive,
has recently been prepared for use in the Air Force. The principal difference is that
the remaining structure is considered to be intact (unflawed) subsequent to the failure of
the principal element. The requirement is stated as follows in reference 18:
"Fail Safe. Primary structure that is designed fail safe shall be read-
ily inspectable and meet the following requirements a_ter failure of a principal
structural element: (1) the remaining structure shall sustain without failure,
the maximum expected load or limit load, whichever is greater, (2) the air-
plane shall be controllable within the design speed limits, and (3) catastrophic
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failure of the remaining structure will not occur under repeated load condi-
tions during the time period to the next opportunity to detect the failure.
Verification of the ability of the remaining structure to withstand the
repeated loads shall be accomplishedby determining the crack growth
period from an initial flaw to failure of the principal element, andthen
insuring that the life (including a factor of four) of the remaining structure
will equalor exceedthe time interval establishedfor the next inspection.
Inspection intervals shall beas agreed to by the procuring agency. . ."
Fracture Control - Verification andDemonstration
In the preceding discussion, requirements for analysis were presented. In certain
instances, experimental verification or demonstration of complianceshouldbe required.
Safe crack growth tests (class 1 and class 3).- Although basic growth-rate data will
be generated to support analysis techniques, it is desirable to augment the constant-
amplitude tests with spectrum crack growth tests conducted on a meaningful flight-by-
flight basis. This is particularly true where reliance has been placed upon positive
detection by surface flaws penetrating the member thickness. In most cases, these
experiments can be conducted on representative coupons, or small specimens if stresses
are well known. If the geometry is complex, it is more desirable to utilize prototype
component structure and run the growth tests in conjunction with the static or cyclic
preproduction tests.
Demonstration tests utilizing full-scale structures (i.e., complete aircraft) should
not be necessary since it is generally quite easy to duplicate localized conditions sur-
rounding the crack tip.
Damage arrest (class 2).- Demonstration of crack arrest capability and subsequent
cyclic life should be required. These tests may be conducted on representative speci-
mens or on the full-scale aircraft at the conclusion of the static or fatigue test. In most
cases, critical damage is introduced mechanically to simulate service condition (battle
damage, etc.).
Establishment of Inspection Procedures
An additional function served by the safe crack growth analysis is the establish-
ment of inspection procedures for an individual structure or for all members in the air-
craft which are manufactured from the same material. The use of fracture analysis
procedures allows inspection or rejection with more confidence by classifying parts and
regions within a part according to the required NDI sensitivity.
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The developmentof suchan inspection procedure for a typical application is illus-
trated as follows. Spectrumcrack growth information is plotted in figure 20(a)as a
function of the initial crack size (only a0 is shown)for various degreesof spectrum
severity (maximum stress). In this example, the required safe growth period is N hours,
and a0 is the largest crack size that canbe tolerated for this material application. The
maximum expectedspectrum stress is g4" NDI procedures must insure the reliable
detection of a0 during fabrication and assembly.
This spectrum growth information is translated into more meaningful form in fig-
ure 20(b) where, for any level of design stress, the largest tolerable flaw which would
grow to failure in N hours is plotted. Rather than using fracture at N hours, a
criterion based on positive detection could be substituted and produce a similar diagram.
Application of Requirements
While the full impact of the proposed fracture requirements can only be assessed
through an extensive design application study on an existing system, the relative severity
can be assessed by studying typical examples. The following example illustrates the
values of design stress for a single material which would result under each requirement
listed in table III:
Example: Tension cover; aircraft type, fighter
Material, 7075-T6
Kic =30 ksi-i .
Thickness = 0.375 in.
Initial flaw assumptions (surface flaw) (a/2c = 0.5):
a I = 0.050 in.
a 2= 0.150in.
Final flaw size:
(for all inspectable cases)
(for all noninspectable cases)
a 4 = Minimum detectable size = 0.375 in.
a 3 = Minimum acceptable equivalent = 0.500 in. for single load
path structure
Stress information"
The fighter spectrum information is contained in table IV in
terms of a unit of maximum stress value a = 37 ksi. These occur-
rences in table IV are the equivalent of 40 hours of flight. The maxi-
mum limit stress for design purposes is:
crL = 1.5_ = 55.5 ksi
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Spectrumgrowth-rate data:
By utilizing constant-amplitudegrowth-rate data (ref. 19), the
CRACKScomputer routine (ref. 20), andthe AFFDL crack growth
retardation model (ref. 10), the stress spectrum (table IV) was
translated into plots of crack depth a as a function of number of
flights starting with an initial crack length a1 = 0.050 in. (fig. 21)
and a 2 = 0.150 in. (fig. 22). All levels of stress from table IV were
increased or decreased proportionally to achieve the variation in
growth due to spectrum severity.
Material toughness:
The cutoff line for KIc = 30 ksi-_, is indicated in figures 21
and 22. The effect of varying this parameter was not investigated in
this example.
Life requirement:
Service life = 160 blocks = 160 x 40 = 6400 hours. Inspection
intervals are planned each 1/4 lifetime of 40 blocks = 1600 hours.
Requirement A:
Initial crack depth:
a 1 = 0.050 in.
Final crack depth:
a 3 = 0.500 in. (based on positive detection)
Life requirement:
N A = 80 blocks = Two inspection intervals
Design stress _A:
This goal cannot be achieved with this material since Kic is
limited to 30 ksi-i_, and the inspection requirement of 0.500 in. is
not possible. A material change would most likely be required.
Requirement C:
Initial crack depth:
a 1 = 0.050 in.
Final crack depth:
a 4 = 0.375 in. (based on positive detection)
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Life requirement:
NC = 80 blocks
Design stress, maximum:
_C (allowable) = 1.27_ = 47 ksi
Requirement D:
Initial crack depth:
a 2 = 0.150 in.
Life requirement:
N D = 160 blocks = One lifetime
Final crack depth:
a 5 = Plane strain fracture > 1.0 in.
Design stress, maximum:
_D (allowable) = 0.81_ = 31 ksi
Requirement E:
Initial crack depth:
a 1 = 0.050 in.
Final crack depth:
a 5 = Plane strain fracture = 0.58 in.
Life requirement:
N E = 160 blocks
Design stress, maximum:
_E (allowable) = 1.08_ = 40 ksi
Requirement F:
Coupled with requirement C is the additional requirement that the struc-
ture remaining after failure of the principal member will be capable of carry-
ing limit load for one additional inspection period, or 1/4 lifetime. The lower
portion of the growth data from figure 21 has been replotted in figure 23.
(a) Assume that the member breaks accidentally after the first flight and
remains undetected until the next inspection interval. The stress is assumed
to increase by 20 percent, with the requirement being no failure at limit load in
1/4 lifetime or 40 blocks. From figure 23, it can be seen that a stress level
of approximately 1.6a = 60 ksi would grow to failure in 40 blocks.
Therefore
ffFa(allowable) = _60 = 50 ksi1.20
(b) Assume the member failure to be at 1/4 lifetime (just subsequent
to inspection). The crack in the remaining structure has grown an amount
Aa during the first inspection period. Thus,
New initial a = a 1 + _a = 0.050 + ,Xa
This condition can be satisfied by trial and error by using figure 23. The
result indicates that aFb _ 1.2a = 44.4 is appropriate for this condition.
Failure at any other time could be checked to see whether a lower stress
would result. Note that no criterion for positive detection was required
since at the next inspection the broken member would be found.
Requirement G:
In a similar manner, requirement E should be checked for life after
member failure.
(a) Assume failure on first flight (from fig. 21)
_E = 1.08or = 40 ksi
aE = 33.3 ksi
"" gGa = 1.'-_
(b) Assume failure at 1/2 lifetime.
first 1/2 lifetime must be added to a 1.
life shall then be determined.
level of aGb= 1.0a= 37.0 ksi
Summary:
The following table is a summary of the previous example:
The incremental growth during the
The requirement for 1/2 remaining
From figure 21, by trial and error, a stress
is seen to satisfy the requirements.
Condition
Inspectable class 1
Inspectable class 3
Noninspectable class 1
Noninspectable class 3
Inspectable class 1
Noninspectable class 3
Requirement Design stress, % ksi
A Not satisfied
C 47
D 31
E 40
F a 50 4_F b 44.
Ga 33.3"_
G b 37.09
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The results clearly indicate the advantagesoffered by designingfor inspectability
since the allowable stresses for requirements C and F are greater than for require-
ment G. The incentive for multiple, in lieu of single, load pathdesign is seenin the
resultant allowable design stresses for requirements E and G beinggreater than for
requirement D.
ANALYSIS AND DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
The successful implementation of the fracture control analysis requires the ana-
lytical capability for cyclic and environmental flaw growth, aircraft usage information,
and basic strength and fracture data for proposed candidate materials.
Criteria Requirements
Initial considerations for fracture resistance and control of subcritical flaw growth
must be established during the criteria development stage and must reflect appropriate
chemical, thermal, and operational loads environments. For example, recent materials
usage has necessitated the generation of data on sustained-load flaw growth in aggressive
environments such as fuel and water (fig. 24(a)). Because loading rate and dwell times
are important in the assessment of environmental effects, it has become important also
to generate load-time spectra of the type indicated in figure 24(b).
Material Data Requirements
The major material strength and fracture properties required to perform the ana-
lyses and trade studies for fracture considerations are illustrated in figure 25. In all
cases (except Kic ) no approved standard test methods exist to determine these proper-
ties. Through experience, however, various test techniques and specimens have evolved.
(See fig. 25.) As is often the case, a specimen developed for one function or application
is used to generate a multitude of data. Testing techniques and data interpretation may
mask important material responses or indicate false reaction to stress and environment.
For example, in a recent comparison of cyclic growth-rate behavior in D6ac steel
(refs. 9, 11, and 12) comparative growth rates obtained from compact tension and surface-
flawed specimens indicated a predominant stress-level effect for the surface-flawed
specimen, whereas no clear dependency was observed for the compact tension case
(fig. 26). These effects are currently being investigated.
Fracture Analysis Methods
Prediction of fracture and growth behavior requires a means of translating external
applied loads into stresses in the region of the crack tip. Finite-element techniques
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offer a vast potential in the area, particularly in complex structural arrangements
(refs. 21 and 22). A rather broad collection of stress intensity solutions exists (ref. 4);
however, their use is limited in many casesandextrapolation is often required to pro-
vide the best estimate of K.
Considerable effort is being expendedin the developmentof computer routines to
"integrate" growth-rate (da/dN) data (ref. 20), for example, andto accountfor the retar-
dation effect of overloads in variable-amplitude spectra. As an exampleof this type of
activity, the AFFDL has recently developeda mathematical model for predicting the
growth delay effect (ref. 10). The basic model is concernedwith the effect of the over-
load plastic zoneon the subsequentrate of growth as indicated in figure 27. A hypotheti-
cal residual or reduction stress is then computedwhich suppressesthe subsequentcyclic
loads. Retardation is accomplished in three modes,dependingon the relative size of the
overload in relation to the subsequentcyclic level (fig. 28). Effective AK and R
values are computedand reduced rates obtainedfrom normal da/dN and AK relation-
ships. Note that growth canbe completely stopped(fig. 28). An extensivetesting pro-
gram is being completedat AFFDL to evaluate the merit of the model. In figure 29are
someearly correlations with single overloads in aluminum (ref. 6). Fairly goodcorrela-
tion is noted also with randomizedblock spectrum data for D6ac steel (fig. 30).
Growth analysis schemesneedto be extendedto include the effects of loading rate
and delay time (sustainedload growth). Free surface effects andflaw shapechanges,
including the transition of a surface flaw to a through crack, must be included.
SUGGESTEDAREASOF STUDY
The suggestedareas of study for the application of fracture mechanics in struc-
tural integrity havebeensummarized and are presentedas table V. This table is
obtainedfrom reference 23.
CONCLUDINGREMARKSAND RECOMMENDEDTOPICSFORSTUDY
The author hasattempted to present the significant impact of fracture mechanics
and fracture control in the overall program of airframe structural integrity. The true
weight, cost, andperformance trade-offs associatedwith the implementation of these or
any requirement canbest be judged by experience and application to existing systems.
A fair assessmentcanonly occur, however, if continuedmaterials and structures devel-
opmentefforts are directed toward upgradingexisting fracture mechanics andfracture
analysis technology.
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The author has summarized in tabular form a rather extensive"shopping list" of
items which require attention. In many cases,a relatively high degreeof proficiency
exists andapplication experienceis all that is necessary while others require new
thoughtand newdirection.
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TABLE IV.- STRESSSPECTRUMFORFIGHTERAIRCRAFT EXAMPLEa
Layer amin, _max, Cycles Layer amin, amax,ksi ksi Cyclesksi ksi .j
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
0.06
7.04
.45
5.90
.79
10.60
.76
4.02
3.64
6.77
3.64
6.07
8.64
9.51
3.78
0.0
3.81
7.88
.72
9.37
16.6
27.0
13.7
26.4
17.5
25.4
14.2
28.7
10.7
22.9
16.6
17.5
21.8
19.1
14.0
13.9
17.5
13.4
10.4
16.0
63
76
371
37
111
2
363
5
1280
62
1
89
41
57
491
6
74
682
1376
66
30
31
32
33
34
.52
6.76
7.98
.45
0.0
7.08
7.39
.06
1.63
17.2
8.6
11.8
10.6
8.8
28.5
22.8
22.1
13.9
34
1621
1589
1374
67
1
250
8
2
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
7.94
3.64
7.57
7.15
7.91
1.63
.79
7.81
3.68
0.0
7.18
2.01
1.59
.06
1.59
7.91
0.0
7.57
8.26
7.98
8.19
7.98
.06
3.85
0.0
.48
7.08
3.85
2.01
34.9
16.1
16.8
25.6
37.0
6.3
20.8
20.2
11.8
11.3
17.9
13.9
8.8
11.9
11.3
31.7
16.4
14.5
24.9
26.1
12.9
10.7
19.8
10.4
6.4
16.1
14.9
20.8
13.9
2
37
367
109
1
265
34
318
6
21
374
478
46
300
10
4
4
306
15
5
230
1338
19
1546
238
114
370
7
478
aSingleblock is equivalentof 40 flight hours.
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Figure 29.- Comparisonof test andpredictedcrackgrowth. Singleoverload.
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Figure 30.- Comparisonof testand predictedcrackgrowth. Randomizedblockspectrumloading.
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